Book 2
Our purpose is to consider what form of political community is best of all
for those who are most able to realize their ideal of life. We must
therefore examine not only this but other constitutions, both such as
actually exist in well-governed states, and any theoretical forms which are
held in esteem; that what is good and useful may be brought to light. And
let no one suppose that in seeking for something beyond them we are anxious
to make a sophistical display at any cost; we only undertake this inquiry
because all the constitutions with which we are acquainted are faulty.
We will begin with the natural beginning of the subject. Three alternatives
are conceivable: The members of a state must either have
(1) all things or
(2) nothing in common, or
(3) some things in common and some not.
That they
should have nothing in common is clearly impossible, for the constitution
is a community, and must at any rate have a common place-
#1261a]
one city will be in one place, and the citizens are those who share in that
one city. But should a well ordered state have all things, as far as may
be, in common, or some only and not others? For the citizens might
conceivably have wives and children and property in common,
as Socrates proposes in the Republic of Plato. Which is better,
our present condition,
or the proposed new order of society.
Section 2.2 There are many difficulties in the community of women. And the
principle on which Socrates rests the necessity of such an institution
evidently is not established by his arguments. Further, as a means to the
end which he ascribes to the state, the scheme, taken literally is
impracticable, and how we are to interpret it is nowhere precisely stated.
I am speaking of the premise from which the argument of Socrates proceeds,
'that the greater the unity of the state the better.' Is it not obvious
that a state may at length attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer
a state? since the nature of a state is to be a plurality, and in tending
to greater unity, from being a state, it becomes a family, and from being a
family, an individual; for the family may be said to be more than the
state, and the individual than the family. So that we ought not to attain
this greatest unity even if we could, for it would be the destruction of
the state. Again, a state is not made up only of so many men, but of
different kinds of men; for similars do not constitute a state. It is not
like a military alliance The usefulness of the latter depends upon its
quantity even where there is no difference in quality (for mutual
protection is the end aimed at), just as a greater weight of anything is
more useful than a less (in like manner, a state differs from a nation,
when the nation has not its population organised in villages, but lives an
Arcadian sort of life); but the elements out of which a unity is to be
formed differ in kind. Wherefore the principle of compensation, as I have
already remarked in the Ethics, is the salvation of states. Even among
freemen and equals this is a principle which must be maintained, for they
cannot an rule together, but must change at the end of a year or some other
period of time or in some order of succession. The result is that upon this
plan they all govern; just as if shoemakers and carpenters were to exchange
their occupations, and the same persons did not always continue shoemakers
and carpenters. And since it is better that this should be so in politics
as well, it is clear that while there should be continuance of the same
persons in power where this is possible,
[#1261b]
yet where this is
not possible by reason of the natural equality of the citizens, and at the
same time it is just that an should share in the government (whether to
govern be a good thing or a bad), an approximation to this is that equals
should in turn retire from office and should, apart from official position,
be treated alike. Thus the one party rule and the others are ruled in turn,
as if they were no longer the same persons. In like manner when they hold
office there is a variety in the offices held. Hence it is evident that a
city is not by nature one in that sense which some persons affirm; and that
what is said to be the greatest good of cities is in reality their
destruction; but surely the good of things must be that which preserves
them. Again, in another point of view, this extreme unification of the
state is clearly not good; for a family is more self-sufficing than an
individual, and a city than a family, and a city only comes into being when
the community is large enough to be self-sufficing. If then
self-sufficiency is to be desired, the lesser degree of unity is more
desirable than the greater.
Section 2.3
But, even supposing that it were best for the community to have the
greatest degree of unity, this unity is by no means proved to follow from
the fact 'of all men saying "mine" and "not mine" at the same instant of
time,' which, according to Socrates, is the sign of perfect unity in a
state. For the word 'all' is ambiguous. If the meaning be that every
individual says 'mine' and 'not mine' at the same time, then perhaps the
result at which Socrates aims may be in some degree accomplished; each man
will call the same person his own son and the same person his wife, and so
of his property and of all that falls to his lot. This, however, is not the
way in which people would speak who had their had their wives and children
in common; they would say 'all' but not 'each.' In like manner their
property would be described as belonging to them, not severally but
collectively. There is an obvious fallacy in the term 'all': like some
other words, 'both,' 'odd,' 'even,' it is ambiguous, and even in abstract
argument becomes a source of logical puzzles. That all persons call the
same thing mine in the sense in which each does so may be a fine thing, but
it is impracticable; or if the words are taken in the other sense, such a
unity in no way conduces to harmony. And there is another objection to the
proposal. For that which is common to the greatest number has the least
care bestowed upon it. Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all
of the common interest; and only when he is himself concerned as an
individual. For besides other considerations, everybody is more inclined to
neglect the duty which he expects another to fulfill; as in families many
attendants are often less useful than a few. Each citizen will have a
thousand sons who will not be his sons individually but anybody will be
equally the son of anybody, and will therefore be neglected by all alike.
Further, upon this principle, every one will use the word 'mine' of one who
is prospering or the reverse, however small a fraction he may himself be of
the whole number; the same boy will be 'so and so's son,' the son of each
of the thousand, or whatever be the number of the citizens; and even about
this he will not be positive; for it is impossible to know who chanced to
have a child, or whether, if one came into existence, it has survived. But
which is better- for each to say 'mine' in this way, making a man the same
relation to two thousand or ten thousand citizens, or to use the word
'mine' in the ordinary and more restricted sense? For usually the same
person is called by one man his own son whom another calls his own brother
or cousin or kinsman- blood relation or connection by marriage either of
himself or of some relation of his, and yet another his clansman or
tribesman; and how much better is it to be the real cousin of somebody than
to be a son after Plato's fashion! Nor is there any way of preventing
brothers and children and fathers and mothers from sometimes recognizing
one another; for children are born like their parents, and they will
necessarily be finding indications of their relationship to one another.
Geographers declare such to be the fact; they say that in part of Upper
Libya, where the women are common, nevertheless the children who are born
are assigned to their respective fathers on the ground of their likeness.
And some women, like the females of other animals- for example, mares and
cows- have a strong tendency to produce offspring resembling their parents,
as was the case with the Pharsalian mare called Honest.
Section 2.4
Other evils, against which it is not easy for the authors of such a
community to guard, will be assaults and homicides, voluntary as well as
involuntary, quarrels and slanders, all which are most unholy acts when
committed against fathers and mothers and near relations, but not equally
unholy when there is no relationship. Moreover, they are much more likely
to occur if the relationship is unknown, and, when they have occurred, the
customary expiations of them cannot be made. Again, how strange it is that
Socrates, after having made the children common, should hinder lovers from
carnal intercourse only, but should permit love and familiarities between
father and son or between brother and brother, than which nothing can be
more unseemly, since even without them love of this sort is improper. How
strange, too, to forbid intercourse for no other reason than the violence
of the pleasure, as though the relationship of father and son or of
brothers with one another made no difference.
This community of wives and children seems better suited to the husbandmen
than to the guardians, for if they have wives and children in common, they
will be bound to one another by weaker ties, as a subject class should be,
and they will remain obedient and not rebel. In a word, the result of such
a law would be just the opposite of which good laws ought to have, and the
intention of Socrates in making these regulations about women and children
would defeat itself. For friendship we believe to be the greatest good of
states and the preservative of them against revolutions; neither is there
anything which Socrates so greatly lauds as the unity of the state which he
and all the world declare to be created by friendship. But the unity which
he commends would be like that of the lovers in the Symposium, who, as
Aristophanes says, desire to grow together in the excess of their
affection, and from being two to become one, in which case one or both
would certainly perish. Whereas in a state having women and children
common, love will be watery; and the father will certainly not say 'my
son,' or the son 'my father.' As a little sweet wine mingled with a great
deal of water is imperceptible in the mixture, so, in this sort of
community, the idea of relationship which is based upon these names will be
lost; there is no reason why the so-called father should care about the
son, or the son about the father, or brothers about one another. Of the two
qualities which chiefly inspire regard and affection- that a thing is your
own and that it is your only one-neither can exist in such a state as this.
Again, the transfer of children as soon as they are born from the rank of
husbandmen or of artisans to that of guardians, and from the rank of
guardians into a lower rank, will be very difficult to arrange; the givers
or transferrers cannot but know whom they are giving and transferring, and
to whom. And the previously mentioned evils, such as assaults, unlawful
loves, homicides, will happen more often amongst those who are transferred
to the lower classes, or who have a place assigned to them among the
guardians; for they will no longer call the members of the class they have
left brothers, and children, and fathers, and mothers, and will not,
therefore, be afraid of committing any crimes by reason of consanguinity.
Touching the community of wives and children, let this be our conclusion.
Section 2.5
Next let us consider what should be our arrangements about property: should
the citizens of the perfect state have their possessions in common or not?
This question may be discussed separately from the enactments about women
and children. Even supposing that the women and children belong to
individuals, according to the custom which is at present universal, may
there not be an advantage in having and using possessions in common? Three
cases are possible: (1) the soil may be appropriated, but the produce may
be thrown for consumption into the common stock; and this is the practice
of some nations. Or (2), the soil may be common, and may be cultivated in
common, but the produce divided among individuals for their private use;
this is a form of common property which is said to exist among certain
barbarians.
Or (3), the soil and the produce may be alike common.
When the husbandmen are not the owners, the case will be different and
easier to deal with; but when they till the ground for themselves the
question of ownership will give a world of trouble. If they do not share
equally enjoyments and toils, those who labor much and get little will
necessarily complain of those who labor little and receive or consume much.
But indeed there is always a difficulty in men living together and having
all human relations in common, but especially in their having common
property. The partnerships of fellow-travelers are an example to the point;
for they generally fall out over everyday matters and quarrel about any
trifle which turns up. So with servants: we are most able to take offense
at those with whom we most we most frequently come into contact in daily
life.
These are only some of the disadvantages which attend the community of
property; the present arrangement, if improved as it might be by good
customs and laws, would be far better, and would have the advantages of
both systems. Property should be in a certain sense common, but, as a
general rule, private; for, when everyone has a distinct interest, men will
not complain of one another, and they will make more progress, because
every one will be attending to his own business. And yet by reason of
goodness, and in respect of use, 'Friends,' as the proverb says, 'will have
all things common.' Even now there are traces of such a principle, showing
that it is not impracticable, but, in well-ordered states, exists already
to a certain extent and may be carried further. For, although every man has
his own property, some things he will place at the disposal of his friends,
while of others he shares the use with them. The Lacedaemonians, for
example, use one another's slaves, and horses, and dogs, as if they were
their own; and when they lack provisions on a journey, they appropriate
what they find in the fields throughout the country. It is clearly better
that property should be private, but the use of it common; and the special
business of the legislator is to create in men this benevolent disposition.
Again, how immeasurably greater is the pleasure, when a man feels a thing
to be his own; for surely the love of self is a feeling implanted by nature
and not given in vain, although selfishness is rightly censured; this,
however, is not the mere love of self, but the love of self in excess, like
the miser's love of money; for all, or almost all, men love money and other
such objects in a measure. And further, there is the greatest pleasure in
doing a kindness or service to friends or guests or companions, which can
only be rendered when a man has private property. These advantages are lost
by excessive unification of the state. The exhibition of two virtues,
besides, is visibly annihilated in such a state: first, temperance towards
women (for it is an honorable action to abstain from another's wife for
temperance' sake); secondly, liberality in the matter of property. No one,
when men have all things in common, will any longer set an example of
liberality or do any liberal action; for liberality consists in the use
which is made of property.
Such legislation may have a specious appearance of benevolence; men readily
listen to it, and are easily induced to believe that in some wonderful
manner everybody will become everybody's friend, especially when some one
is heard denouncing the evils now existing in states, suits about
contracts, convictions for perjury, flatteries of rich men and the like,
which are said to arise out of the possession of private property. These
evils, however, are due to a very different cause- the wickedness of human
nature. Indeed, we see that there is much more quarrelling among those who
have all things in common, though there are not many of them when compared
with the vast numbers who have private property.
Again, we ought to reckon, not only the evils from which the citizens will
be saved, but also the advantages which they will lose. The life which they
are to lead appears to be quite impracticable. The error of Socrates must
be attributed to the false notion of unity from which he starts. Unity
there should be, both of the family and of the state, but in some respects
only. For there is a point at which a state may attain such a degree of
unity as to be no longer a state, or at which, without actually ceasing to
exist, it will become an inferior state, like harmony passing into unison,
or rhythm which has been reduced to a single foot. The state, as I was
saying, is a plurality which should be united and made into a community by
education; and it is strange that the author of a system of education which
he thinks will make the state virtuous, should expect to improve his
citizens by regulations of this sort, and not by philosophy or by customs
and laws, like those which prevail at Sparta and Crete respecting common
meals, whereby the legislator has made property common. Let us remember
that we should not disregard the experience of ages; in the multitude of
years these things, if they were good, would certainly not have been
unknown; for almost everything has been found out, although sometimes they
are not put together; in other cases men do not use the knowledge which
they have. Great light would be thrown on this subject if we could see such
a form of government in the actual process of construction; for the
legislator could not form a state at all without distributing and dividing
its constituents into associations for common meals, and into phratries and
tribes. But all this legislation ends only in forbidding agriculture to the
guardians, a prohibition which the Lacedaemonians try to enforce already.
But, indeed, Socrates has not said, nor is it easy to decide, what in such
a community will be the general form of the state. The citizens who are not
guardians are the majority, and about them nothing has been determined: are
the husbandmen, too, to have their property in common? Or is each
individual to have his own? And are the wives and children to be individual
or common. If, like the guardians, they are to have all things in common,
what do they differ from them, or what will they gain by submitting to
their government? Or, upon what principle would they submit, unless indeed
the governing class adopt the ingenious policy of the Cretans, who give
their slaves the same institutions as their own, but forbid them gymnastic
exercises and the possession of arms. If, on the other hand, the inferior
classes are to be like other cities in respect of marriage and property,
what will be the form of the community? Must it not contain two states in
one, each hostile to the other He makes the guardians into a mere occupying
garrison, while the husbandmen and artisans and the rest are the real
citizens. But if so the suits and quarrels, and all the evils which
Socrates affirms to exist in other states, will exist equally among them.
He says indeed that, having so good an education, the citizens will not
need many laws, for example laws about the city or about the markets; but
then he confines his education to the guardians. Again, he makes the
husbandmen owners of the property upon condition of their paying a tribute.
But in that case they are likely to be much more unmanageable and conceited
than the Helots, or Penestae, or slaves in general. And whether community
of wives and property be necessary for the lower equally with the higher
class or not, and the questions akin to this, what will be the education,
form of government, laws of the lower class, Socrates has nowhere
determined: neither is it easy to discover this, nor is their character of
small importance if the common life of the guardians is to be maintained.
Again, if Socrates makes the women common, and retains private property,
the men will see to the fields, but who will see to the house? And who will
do so if the agricultural class have both their property and their wives in
common? Once more: it is absurd to argue, from the analogy of the animals,
that men and women should follow the same pursuits, for animals have not to
manage a household. The government, too, as constituted by Socrates,
contains elements of danger; for he makes the same persons always rule. And
if this is often a cause of disturbance among the meaner sort, how much
more among high-spirited warriors? But that the persons whom he makes
rulers must be the same is evident; for the gold which the God mingles in
the souls of men is not at one time given to one, at another time to
another, but always to the same: as he says, 'God mingles gold in some, and
silver in others, from their very birth; but brass and iron in those who
are meant to be artisans and husbandmen.' Again, he deprives the guardians
even of happiness, and says that the legislator ought to make the whole
state happy. But the whole cannot be happy unless most, or all, or some of
its parts enjoy happiness. In this respect happiness is not like the even
principle in numbers, which may exist only in the whole, but in neither of
the parts; not so happiness. And if the guardians are not happy, who are?
Surely not the artisans, or the common people. The Republic of which
Socrates discourses has all these difficulties, and others quite as great.
Section 2.6 The same, or nearly the same, objections apply to Plato's later
work, the Laws, and therefore we had better examine briefly the
constitution which is therein described. In the Republic, Socrates has
definitely settled in all a few questions only; such as the community of
women and children, the community of property, and the constitution of the
state. The population is divided into two classes- one of husbandmen, and
the other of warriors; from this latter is taken a third class of
counselors and rulers of the state. But Socrates has not determined whether
the husbandmen and artisans are to have a share in the government, and
whether they, too, are to carry arms and share in military service, or not.
He certainly thinks that the women ought to share in the education of the
guardians, and to fight by their side. The remainder of the work is filled
up with digressions foreign to the main subject, and with discussions about
the education of the guardians. In the Laws there is hardly anything but
laws; not much is said about the constitution. This, which he had intended
to make more of the ordinary type, he gradually brings round to the other
or ideal form. For with the exception of the community of women and
property, he supposes everything to be the same in both states; there is to
be the same education; the citizens of both are to live free from servile
occupations, and there are to be common meals in both. The only difference
is that in the Laws, the common meals are extended to women, and the
warriors number 5000, but in the Republic only 1000.
The discourses of Socrates are never commonplace; they always exhibit grace
and originality and thought; but perfection in everything can hardly be
expected. We must not overlook the fact that the number of 5000 citizens,
just now mentioned, will require a territory as large as Babylon, or some
other huge site, if so many persons are to be supported in idleness,
together with their women and attendants, who will be a multitude many
times as great. In framing an ideal we may assume what we wish, but should
avoid impossibilities.
It is said that the legislator ought to have his eye directed to two
points- the people and the country. But neighboring countries also must not
be forgotten by him, firstly because the state for which he legislates is
to have a political and not an isolated life. For a state must have such a
military force as will be serviceable against her neighbors, and not merely
useful at home. Even if the life of action is not admitted to be the best,
either for individuals or states, still a city should be formidable to
enemies, whether invading or retreating.
There is another point: Should not the amount of property be defined in
some way which differs from this by being clearer? For Socrates says that a
man should have so much property as will enable him to live temperately,
which is only a way of saying 'to live well'; this is too general a
conception. Further, a man may live temperately and yet miserably. A better
definition would be that a man must have so much property as will enable
him to live not only temperately but liberally; if the two are parted,
liberally will combine with luxury; temperance will be associated with
toil. For liberality and temperance are the only eligible qualities which
have to do with the use of property. A man cannot use property with
mildness or courage, but temperately and liberally he may; and therefore
the practice of these virtues is inseparable from property. There is an
inconsistency, too, in too, in equalizing the property and not regulating
the number of the citizens; the population is to remain unlimited, and he
thinks that it will be sufficiently equalized by a certain number of
marriages being unfruitful, however many are born to others, because he
finds this to be the case in existing states. But greater care will be
required than now; for among ourselves, whatever may be the number of
citizens, the property is always distributed among them, and therefore no
one is in want; but, if the property were incapable of division as in the
Laws, the supernumeraries, whether few or many, would get nothing. One
would have thought that it was even more necessary to limit population than
property; and that the limit should be fixed by calculating the chances of
mortality in the children, and of sterility in married persons. The neglect
of this subject, which in existing states is so common, is a never-failing
cause of poverty among the citizens; and poverty is the parent of
revolution and crime. Pheidon the Corinthian, who was one of the most
ardent legislators, thought that the families and the number of citizens
ought to remain the same, although originally all the lots may have been of
different sizes: but in the Laws the opposite principle is maintained. What
in our opinion is the right arrangement will have to be explained
hereafter.
There is another omission in the Laws: Socrates does not tell us how the
rulers differ from their subjects; he only says that they should be related
as the warp and the woof, which are made out of different wools. He allows
that a man's whole property may be increased fivefold, but why should not
his land also increase to a certain extent? Again, will the good management
of a household be promoted by his arrangement of homesteads? For he assigns
to each individual two homesteads in separate places, and it is difficult
to live in two houses.
The whole system of government tends to be neither democracy nor oligarchy,
but something in a mean between them, which is usually called a polity, and
is composed of the heavy-armed soldiers. Now, if he intended to frame a
constitution which would suit the greatest number of states, he was very
likely right, but not if he meant to say that this constitutional form came
nearest to his first or ideal state; for many would prefer the
Lacedaemonian, or, possibly, some other more aristocratic government. Some,
indeed, say that the best constitution is a combination of all existing
forms, and they praise the Lacedaemonian because it is made up of
oligarchy, monarchy, and democracy, the king forming the monarchy, and the
council of elders the oligarchy while the democratic element is represented
by the Ephors; for the Ephors are selected from the people. Others,
however, declare the Ephoralty to be a tyranny, and find the element of
democracy in the common meals and in the habits of daily life. In the Laws
it is maintained that the best constitution is made up of democracy and
tyranny, which are either not constitutions at all, or are the worst of
all. But they are nearer the truth who combine many forms; for the
constitution is better which is made up of more numerous elements. The
constitution proposed in the Laws has no element of monarchy at all; it is
nothing but oligarchy and democracy, leaning rather to oligarchy. This is
seen in the mode of appointing magistrates; for although the appointment of
them by lot from among those who have been already selected combines both
elements, the way in which the rich are compelled by law to attend the
assembly and vote for magistrates or discharge other political duties,
while the rest may do as they like, and the endeavor to have the greater
number of the magistrates appointed out of the richer classes and the
highest officers selected from those who have the greatest incomes, both
these are oligarchical features. The oligarchical principle prevails also
in the choice of the council, for all are compelled to choose, but the
compulsion extends only to the choice out of the first class, and of an
equal number out of the second class and out of the third class, but not in
this latter case to all the voters but to those of the first three classes;
and the selection of candidates out of the fourth class is only compulsory
on the first and second. Then, from the persons so chosen, he says that
there ought to be an equal number of each class selected. Thus a
preponderance will be given to the better sort of people, who have the
larger incomes, because many of the lower classes, not being compelled will
not vote. These considerations, and others which will be adduced when the
time comes for examining similar polities, tend to show that states like
Plato's should not be composed of democracy and monarchy. There is also a
danger in electing the magistrates out of a body who are themselves
elected; for, if but a small number choose to combine, the elections will
always go as they desire. Such is the constitution which is described in
the Laws.