Then if the man is like the State, I said, must not the same rule
prevail? His soul is full of meanness and vulgarity - the best elements in
him are enslaved; and there is a small ruling part, which is also the worst
And would you say that the soul of such a one is the soul of a freeman
or of a slave?
He has the soul of a slave, in my opinion.
And the State which is enslaved under a tyrant is utterly incapable of
And also the soul which is under a tyrant (I am speaking of the soul
taken as a whole) is least capable of doing what she desires; there is a
gadfly which goads her, and she is full of trouble and remorse?
And is the city which is under a tyrant rich or poor?
And the tyrannical soul must be always poor and insatiable?
And must not such a State and such a man be always full of fear?
Is there any State in which you will find more of lamentation and sorrow
and groaning and pain?
And is there any man in whom you will find more of this sort of misery
than in the tyrannical man, who is in a fury of passions and desires?
Reflecting upon these and similar evils, you held the tyrannical State
to be the most miserable of States?
And I was right, he said.
Certainly, I said. And when you see the same evils in the tyrannical
man, what do you say of him?
I say that he is by far the most miserable of all men.
There, I said, I think that you are beginning to go wrong.
What do you mean?
I do not think that he has as yet reached the utmost extreme of misery.
Then who is more miserable?
One of whom I am about to speak.
Who is that?
He who is of a tyrannical nature, and instead of leading a private life
has been cursed with the further misfortune of being a public tyrant.
From what has been said, I gather that you are right.
Yes, I replied, but in this high argument you should be a little more
certain, and should not conjecture only; for of all questions, this
respecting good and evil is the greatest.
Very true, he said.
Let me then offer you an illustration, which may, I think, throw a light
upon this subject.
What is your illustration?
The case of rich individuals in cities who possess many slaves: from
them you may form an idea of the tyrant's condition, for they both have
slaves; the only difference is that he has more slaves.
Yes, that is the difference.
You know that they live securely and have nothing to apprehend from
What should they fear?
Nothing. But do you observe the reason of this?
Yes; the reason is, that the whole city is leagued together for the
protection of each individual.
Very true, I said. But imagine one of these owners, the master say of
some fifty slaves, together with his family and property and slaves,
carried off by a god into the wilderness, where there are no freemen to
help him - will he not be in an agony of fear lest he and his wife and
children should be put to death by his slaves?
Yes, he said, he will be in the utmost fear.
The time has arrived when he will be compelled to flatter divers of his
slaves, and make many promises to them of freedom and other things, much
against his will - he will have to cajole his own servants.
Yes, he said, that will be the only way of saving himself.
And suppose the same god, who carried him away, to surround him with
neighbours who will not suffer one man to be the master of another, and
who, if they could catch the offender, would take his life?
His case will be still worse, if you suppose him to be everywhere
surrounded and watched by enemies.
And is not this the sort of prison in which the tyrant will be bound -
who being by nature such as we have described, is full of all sorts of
fears and lusts? His soul is dainty and greedy, and yet alone, of all men
in the city, he is never allowed to go on a journey, or to see the things
which other freemen desire to see, but he lives in his hole like a woman
hidden in the house, and is jealous of any other citizen who goes into
foreign parts and sees anything of interest.
Very true, he said.
And amid evils such as these will not he who is ill-governed in his own
person - the tyrannical man, I mean - whom you just now decided to be the
miserable of all - will not he be yet more miserable when, instead of
a private life, he is constrained by fortune to be a public tyrant? He has
to be master of others when he is not master of himself: he is like a
diseased or paralytic man who is compelled to pass his life, not in
retirement, but fighting and combating with other men.
Yes, he said, the similitude is most exact.
Is not his case utterly miserable? and does not the actual tyrant lead a
worse life than he whose life you determined to be the worst?
He who is the real tyrant, whatever men may think, is the real slave,
and is obliged to practise the greatest adulation and servility, and to be
the flatterer of the vilest of mankind. He has desires which he is utterly
unable to satisfy, and has more wants than anyone, and is truly poor, if
you know how to inspect the whole soul of him: all his life long he is
beset with fear and is full of convulsions and distractions, even as the
State which he resembles: and surely the resemblance holds?
Very true, he said.
Moreover, as we were saying before, he grows worse from having power: he
becomes and is of necessity more jealous, more faithless, more unjust, more
friendless, more impious, than he was at first; he is the purveyor and
cherisher of every sort of vice, and the consequence is that he is
supremely miserable, and that he makes everybody else as miserable as
No man of any sense will dispute your words. Come, then, I said, and as
the general umpire in theatrical contests proclaims the result, do you also
decide who in your opinion is first in the scale of happiness, and who
second, and in what order the others follow: there are five of them in all
- they are the royal, timocratical, oligarchical, democratical,
The decision will be easily given, he replied; they shall be choruses
coming on the stage, and I must judge them in the order in which they
enter, by the criterion of virtue and vice, happiness and misery.
Need we hire a herald, or shall I announce that the son of Ariston (the
best) has decided that the best and justest is also the happiest, and that
this is he who is the most royal man and king over himself; and that the
worst and most unjust man is also the most miserable, and that this is he
who being the greatest tyrant of himself is also the greatest tyrant of his
Make the proclamation yourself, he said.
And shall I add, "whether seen or unseen by gods and men"?
Let the words be added.
Then this, I said, will be our first proof; and there is another, which
may also have some weight.
What is that?
The second proof is derived from the nature of the soul: seeing that the
individual soul, like the State, has been divided by us into three
principles, the division may, I think, furnish a new demonstration.
Of what nature?
It seems to me that to these three principles three pleasures
correspond; also three desires and governing powers.
How do you mean? he said.
There is one principle with which, as we were saying, a man learns,
another with which he is angry; the third, having many forms, has no
special name, but is denoted by the general term appetitive, from the
extraordinary strength and vehemence of the desires of eating and drinking
and the other sensual appetites which are the main elements of it; also
money-loving, because such desires are generally satisfied by the help of
That is true, he said.
If we were to say that the loves and pleasures of this third part were
concerned with gain, we should then be able to fall back on a single
notion; and might truly and intelligibly describe this part of the soul as
loving gain or money.
I agree with you.
Again, is not the passionate element wholly set on ruling and conquering
and getting fame?
Suppose we call it the contentious or ambitious - would the term be
On the other hand, everyone sees that the principle of knowledge is
wholly directed to the truth, and cares less than either of the others for
gain or fame.
"Lover of wisdom," "lover of knowledge," are titles which we may fitly
apply to that part of the soul?
One principle prevails in the souls of one class of men, another in
others, as may happen?
Then we may begin by assuming that there are three classes of men -
of wisdom, lovers of honour, lovers of gain?
And there are three kinds of pleasure, which are their several objects?
Now, if you examine the three classes of men, and ask of them in turn
which of their lives is pleasantest, each will be found praising his own
and depreciating that of others: the money-maker will contrast the vanity
of honour or of learning if they bring no money with the solid advantages
of gold and silver?
True, he said.
And the lover of honour - what will be his opinion? Will he not think
the pleasure of riches is vulgar, while the pleasure of learning, if it
brings no distinction, is all smoke and nonsense to him?
And are we to suppose, I said, that the philosopher sets any value on
other pleasures in comparison with the pleasure of knowing the truth, and
in that pursuit abiding, ever learning, not so far indeed from the heaven
of pleasure? Does he not call the other pleasures necessary, under the idea
that if there were no necessity for them, he would rather not have them?
There can be no doubt of that, he replied.
Since, then, the pleasures of each class and the life of each are in
dispute, and the question is not which life is more or less honourable, or
better or worse, but which is the more pleasant or painless - how shall we
know who speaks truly?
I cannot myself tell, he said.
Well, but what ought to be the criterion? Is any better than experience,
and wisdom, and reason?
There cannot be a better, he said.
Then, I said, reflect. Of the three individuals, which has the greatest
experience of all the pleasures which we enumerated? Has the lover of gain,
in learning the nature of essential truth, greater experience of the
pleasure of knowledge than the philosopher has of the pleasure of gain?
The philosopher, he replied, has greatly the advantage; for he has of
necessity always known the taste of the other pleasures from his childhood
upward: but the lover of gain in all his experience has not of necessity
tasted - or, I should rather say, even had he desired, could hardly have
tasted - the sweetness of learning and knowing truth.
Then the lover of wisdom has a great advantage over the lover of gain,
for he has a double experience?
Yes, very great.
Again, has he greater experience of the pleasures of honour, or the
lover of honour of the pleasures of wisdom?
Nay, he said, all three are honoured in proportion as they attain their
object; for the rich man and the brave man and the wise man alike have
their crowd of admirers, and as they all receive honour they all have
experience of the pleasures of honour; but the delight which is to be found
in the knowledge of true being is known to the philosopher only.
His experience, then, will enable him to judge better than anyone?
And he is the only one who has wisdom as well as experience?
Further, the very faculty which is the instrument of judgment is not
possessed by the covetous or ambitious man, but only by the philosopher?
Reason, with whom, as we were saying, the decision ought to rest.
And reasoning is peculiarly his instrument?
If wealth and gain were the criterion, then the praise or blame of the
lover of gain would surely be the most trustworthy?
Or if honour, or victory, or courage, in that case the judgment of the
ambitious or pugnacious would be the truest?
But since experience and wisdom and reason are the judges -
The only inference possible, he replied, is that pleasures which are
approved by the lover of wisdom and reason are the truest.
And so we arrive at the result, that the pleasure of the intelligent
part of the soul is the pleasantest of the three, and that he of us in whom
this is the ruling principle has the pleasantest life.
Unquestionably, he said, the wise man speaks with authority when he
approves of his own life.
And what does the judge affirm to be the life which is next, and the
pleasure which is next?
Clearly that of the soldier and lover of honour; who is nearer to
himself than the money-maker.
Last comes the lover of gain?
Very true, he said.
Twice in succession, then, has the just man overthrown the unjust in
this conflict; and now comes the third trial, which is dedicated to
Olympian Zeus the saviour: a sage whispers in my ear that no pleasure
except that of the wise is quite true and pure - all others are a shadow
only; and surely this will prove the greatest and most decisive of falls?
Yes, the greatest; but will you explain yourself?
I will work out the subject and you shall answer my questions.
Say, then, is not pleasure opposed to pain?
And there is a neutral state which is neither pleasure nor pain?
A state which is intermediate, and a sort of repose of the soul about
either - that is what you mean?
You remember what people say when they are sick?
What do they say?
That after all nothing is pleasanter than health. But then they never
knew this to be the greatest of pleasures until they were ill.
Yes, I know, he said.
And when persons are suffering from acute pain, you must have heard them
say that there is nothing pleasanter than to get rid of their pain?
And there are many other cases of suffering in which the mere rest and
cessation of pain, and not any positive enjoyment, are extolled by them as
the greatest pleasure?
Yes, he said; at the time they are pleased and well content to be at
Again, when pleasure ceases, that sort of rest or cessation will be
Doubtless, he said.
Then the intermediate state of rest will be pleasure and will also be
So it would seem.
But can that which is neither become both?
I should say not.
And both pleasure and pain are motions of the soul, are they not?
But that which is neither was just now shown to be rest and not motion,
and in a mean between them?
How, then, can we be right in supposing that the absence of pain is
pleasure, or that the absence of pleasure is pain?
Impossible. This, then, is an appearance only, and not a reality; that
is to say, the rest is pleasure at the moment and in comparison of what is
painful, and painful in comparison of what is pleasant; but all these
representations, when tried by the test of true pleasure, are not real, but
a sort of imposition?
That is the inference.
Look at the other class of pleasures which have no antecedent pains and
you will no longer suppose, as you perhaps may at present, that pleasure is
only the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure.
What are they, he said, and where shall I find them?
There are many of them: take as an example, the pleasures of smell,
which are very great and have no antecedent pains; they come in a moment,
and when they depart leave no pain behind them.
Most true, he said.
Let us not, then, be induced to believe that pure pleasure is the
cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure.
Still, the more numerous and violent pleasures which reach the soul
through the body are generally of this sort - they are reliefs of pain.
That is true.
And the anticipations of future pleasures and pains are of a like
Shall I give you an illustration of them?
Let me hear.
You would allow, I said, that there is in nature an upper and lower and
And if a person were to go from the lower to the middle region, would he
not imagine that he is going up; and he who is standing in the middle and
sees whence he has come, would imagine that he is already in the upper
region, if he has never seen the true upper world?
To be sure, he said; how can he think otherwise?
But if he were taken back again he would imagine, and truly imagine,
that he was descending?
All that would arise out of his ignorance of the true upper and middle
and lower regions?
Then can you wonder that persons who are inexperienced in the truth, as
they have wrong ideas about many other things, should also have wrong ideas
about pleasure and pain and the intermediate state; so that when they are
only being drawn toward the painful they feel pain and think the pain which
they experience to be real, and in like manner, when drawn away from pain
to the neutral or intermediate state, they firmly believe that they have
reached the goal of satiety and pleasure; they, not knowing pleasure, err
in contrasting pain with the absence of pain, which is like contrasting
black with grey instead of white - can you wonder, I say, at this?
No, indeed; I should be much more disposed to wonder at the opposite.
Look at the matter thus: Hunger, thirst, and the like, are inanitions of
the bodily state?
And ignorance and folly are inanitions of the soul?
And food and wisdom are the corresponding satisfactions of either?
And is the satisfaction derived from that which has less or from that
which has more existence the truer?
Clearly, from that which has more.
What classes of things have a greater share of pure existence, in your
judgment - those of which food and drink and condiments and all kinds of
sustenance are examples, or the class which contains true opinion and
knowledge and mind and all the different kinds of virtue? Put the question
in this way: Which has a more pure being - that which is concerned with the
invariable, the immortal, and the true, and is of such a nature, and is
found in such natures; or that which is concerned with and found in the
variable and mortal, and is itself variable and mortal?
Far purer, he replied, is the being of that which is concerned with the
And does the essence of the invariable partake of knowledge in the same
degree as of essence?
Yes, of knowledge in the same degree.
And of truth in the same degree?
[Socrates] And, conversely, that which has less of truth will
also have less of essence?
[ Lindsay<< p.282 Less participation in truth means less
participation in being, does it not?]
[Socrates] Then, in general, those kinds of things which are in the
service of the body have less of truth and essence than those which are in
the service of the soul?
[Socrates] And has not the body itself less of truth and essence than
What is filled with more real existence, and actually has a more real
existence, is more really filled than that which is filled with less real
existence and is less real?
And if there be a pleasure in being filled with that which is according
to nature, that which is more really filled with more real being will more
really and truly enjoy true pleasure; whereas that which participates in
less real being will be less truly and surely satisfied, and will
participate in an illusory and less real pleasure?
Unquestionably. Those, then, who know not wisdom and virtue, and are
always busy with gluttony and sensuality, go down and up again as far as
the mean; and in this region they move at random throughout life, but they
never pass into the true upper world; thither they neither look, nor do
they ever find their way, neither are they truly filled with true being,
nor do they taste of pure and abiding pleasure. Like cattle, with their
eyes always looking down and their heads stooping to the earth, that is, to
the dining-table, they fatten and feed and breed, and, in their excessive
love of these delights, they kick and butt at one another with horns and
hoofs which are made of iron; and they kill one another by reason of their
insatiable lust. For they fill themselves with that which is not
substantial, and the part of themselves which they fill is also
unsubstantial and incontinent.
[Glaucon] Verily, Socrates, said Glaucon, you describe the life
of the many like an oracle.
Their pleasures are mixed with pains - how can they be otherwise? For
are mere shadows and pictures of the true, and are coloured by contrast,
which exaggerates both light and shade, and so they implant in the minds of
fools insane desires of themselves; and they are fought about as
Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about the shadow of Helen at Troy,
in ignorance of the truth.
Something of that sort must inevitably happen.
And must not the like happen with the spirited or passionate element of
the soul? Will not the passionate man who carries his passion into action,
be in the like case, whether he is envious and ambitious, or violent and
contentious, or angry and discontented, if he be seeking to attain honour
and victory and the satisfaction of his anger without reason or sense?
Yes, he said, the same will happen with the spirited element also.
Then may we not confidently assert that the lovers of money and honour,
when they seek their pleasures under the guidance and in the company of
reason and knowledge, and pursue after and win the pleasures which wisdom
shows them, will also have the truest pleasures in the highest degree which
is attainable to them, inasmuch as they follow truth; and they will have
the pleasures which are natural to them, if that which is best for each one
is also most natural to him?
Yes, certainly; the best is the most natural.
And when the whole soul follows the philosophical principle, and there
is no division, the several parts are just, and do each of them their own
business, and enjoy severally the best and truest pleasures of which they
But when either of the two other principles prevails, it fails in
attaining its own pleasure, and compels the rest to pursue after a pleasure
which is a shadow only and which is not their own?
And the greater the interval which separates them from philosophy and
reason, the more strange and illusive will be the pleasure?
And is not that farthest from reason which is at the greatest distance
from law and order?
And the lustful and tyrannical desires are, as we saw, at the greatest
And the royal and orderly desires are nearest?
Then the tyrant will live at the greatest distance from true or natural
pleasure, and the king at the least?
But if so, the tyrant will live most unpleasantly, and the king most
Would you know the measure of the interval which separates them?
Will you tell me?
There appear to be three pleasures, one genuine and two spurious: now
the transgression of the tyrant reaches a point beyond the spurious; he has
run away from the region of law and reason, and taken up his abode with
certain slave pleasures which are his satellites, and the measure of his
inferiority can only be expressed in a figure.
How do you mean?
I assume, I said, that the tyrant is in the third place from the
oligarch; the democrat was in the middle?
And if there is truth in what has preceded, he will be wedded to an
image of pleasure which is thrice removed as to truth from the pleasure of
And the oligarch is third from the royal; since we count as one royal
Yes, he is third.
Then the tyrant is removed from true pleasure by the space of a number
which is three times three?
The shadow, then, of tyrannical pleasure determined by the number of
length will be a plane figure.
And if you raise the power and make the plane a solid, there is no
difficulty in seeing how vast is the interval by which the tyrant is parted
from the king.
Yes; the arithmetician will easily do the sum.
Or if some person begins at the other end and measures the interval by
which the king is parted from the tyrant in truth of pleasure, he will find
him, when the multiplication is completed, living 729 times more
pleasantly, and the tyrant more painfully by this same interval.
What a wonderful calculation! And how enormous is the distance which
separates the just from the unjust in regard to pleasure and pain!
Yet a true calculation, I said, and a number which nearly concerns human
life, if human beings are concerned with days and nights and months and
Yes, he said, human life is certainly concerned with them.
Then if the good and just man be thus superior in pleasure to the evil
and unjust, his superiority will be infinitely greater in propriety of life
and in beauty and virtue?
Well, I said, and now having arrived at this stage of the argument, we
may revert to the words which brought us hither: Was not someone saying
that injustice was a gain to the perfectly unjust who was reputed to be
Yes, that was said. Now, then, having determined the power and quality
of justice and injustice, let us have a little conversation with him.
What shall we say to him?
Let us make an image of the soul, that he may have his own words
presented before his eyes.
Of what sort?
An ideal image of the soul, like the composite creations of ancient
mythology, such as the Chimera, or Scylla, or Cerberus, and there are many
others in which two or more different natures are said to grow into one.
There are said to have been such unions.
Then do you now model the form of a multitudinous, many-headed monster,
having a ring of heads of all manner of beasts, tame and wild, which he is
able to generate and metamorphose at will.
You suppose marvellous powers in the artist; but, as language is more
pliable than wax or any similar substance, let there be such a model as you
Suppose now that you make a second form as of a lion, and a third of a
man, the second smaller than the first, and the third smaller than the
That, he said, is an easier task; and I have made them as you say.
And now join them, and let the three grow into one.
That has been accomplished.
Next fashion the outside of them into a single image, as of a man, so
that he who is not able to look within, and sees only the outer hull, may
believe the beast to be a single human creature. I have done so, he said.
And now, to him who maintains that it is profitable for the human
creature to be unjust, and unprofitable to be just, let us reply that, if
he be right, it is profitable for this creature to feast the multitudinous
monster and strengthen the lion and the lion-like qualities, but to starve
and weaken the man, who is consequently liable to be dragged about at the
mercy of either of the other two; and he is not to attempt to familiarize
or harmonize them with one another - he ought rather to suffer them to
and bite and devour one another.
Certainly, he said; that is what the approver of injustice says.
To him the supporter of justice makes answer that he should ever so
speak and act as to give the man within him in some way or other the most
complete mastery over the entire human creature.
He should watch over the many-headed monster like a good husbandman,
fostering and cultivating the gentle qualities, and preventing the wild
ones from growing; he should be making the lion-heart his ally, and in
common care of them all should be uniting the several parts with one
another and with himself.
Yes, he said, that is quite what the maintainer of justice will say.
And so from every point of view, whether of pleasure, honour, or
advantage, the approver of justice is right and speaks the truth, and the
disapprover is wrong and false and ignorant?
Yes, from every point of view.
Come, now, and let us gently reason with the unjust, who is not
intentionally in error. "Sweet sir," we will say to him, "what think you of
things esteemed noble and ignoble? Is not the noble that which subjects the
beast to the man, or rather to the god in man? and the ignoble that which
subjects the man to the beast?" He can hardly avoid saying, Yes - can he,
now? Not if he has any regard for my opinion. But, if he agree so far, we
may ask him to answer another question: "Then how would a man profit if he
received gold and silver on the condition that he was to enslave the
noblest part of him to the worst? Who can imagine that a man who sold his
son or daughter into slavery for money, especially if he sold them into the
hands of fierce and evil men, would be the gainer, however large might be
the sum which he received? And will anyone say that he is not a miserable
caitiff who remorselessly sells his own divine being to that which is most
godless and detestable? Eriphyle took the necklace as the price of her
husband's life, but he is taking a bribe in order to compass a worse ruin."
Yes, said Glaucon, far worse - I will answer for him.
Has not the intemperate been censured of old, because in him the huge
multiform monster is allowed to be too much at large?
And men are blamed for pride and bad temper when the lion and serpent
element in them disproportionately grows and gains strength?
And luxury and softness are blamed, because they relax and weaken this
same creature, and make a coward of him?
And is not a man reproached for flattery and meanness who subordinates
the spirited animal to the unruly monster, and, for the sake of money, of
which he can never have enough, habituates him in the days of his youth to
be trampled in the mire, and from being a lion to become a monkey?
True, he said.
And why are mean employments and manual arts a reproach? Only because
they imply a natural weakness of the higher principle; the individual is
unable to control the creatures within him, but has to court them, and his
great study is how to flatter them.
Such appears to be the reason.
And therefore, being desirous of placing him under a rule like that of
the best, we say that he ought to be the servant of the best, in whom the
Divine rules; not, as Thrasymachus supposed, to the injury of the servant,
but because everyone had better be ruled by divine wisdom dwelling within
him; or, if this be impossible, then by an external authority, in order
that we may be all, as far as possible, under the same government, friends
True, he said.
And this is clearly seen to be the intention of the law, which is the
ally of the whole city; and is seen also in the authority which we exercise
over children, and the refusal to let them be free until we have
established in them a principle analogous to the constitution of a State,
and by cultivation of this higher element have set up in their hearts a
guardian and ruler like our own, and when this is done they may go their
Yes, he said, the purpose of the law is manifest.
From what point of view, then, and on what ground can we say that a man
is profited by injustice or intemperance or other baseness, which will make
him a worse man, even though he acquire money or power by his wickedness?
From no point of view at all.
What shall he profit, if his injustice be undetected and unpunished? He
who is undetected only gets worse, whereas he who is detected and punished
has the brutal part of his nature silenced and humanized; the gentler
element in him is liberated, and his whole soul is perfected and ennobled
by the acquirement of justice and temperance and wisdom, more than the body
ever is by receiving gifts of beauty, strength, and health, in proportion
as the soul is more honourable than the body.
Certainly, he said.
To this nobler purpose the man of understanding will devote the energies
of his life. And in the first place, he will honour studies which impress
these qualities on his soul, and will disregard others?
Clearly, he said.
In the next place, he will regulate his bodily habit and training, and
so far will he be from yielding to brutal and irrational pleasures, that he
will regard even health as quite a secondary matter; his first object will
be not that he may be fair or strong or well, unless he is likely thereby
to gain temperance, but he will always desire so to attemper the body as to
preserve the harmony of the soul?
Certainly he will, if he has true music in him.
And in the acquisition of wealth there is a principle of order and
harmony which he will also observe; he will not allow himself to be dazzled
by the foolish applause of the world, and heap up riches to his own
Certainly not, he said.
He will look at the city which is within him, and take heed that no
disorder occur in it, such as might arise either from superfluity or from
want; and upon this principle he will regulate his property and gain or
spend according to his means.
And, for the same reason, he will gladly accept and enjoy such honours
as he deems likely to make him a better man; but those, whether private or
public, which are likely to disorder his life, he will avoid?
Then, if that is his motive, he will not be a statesman.
By the dog of Egypt, he will! in the city which is his own he certainly
will, though in the land of his birth perhaps not, unless he have a divine
I understand; you mean that he will be a ruler in the city of which we
are the founders, and which exists in idea only; for I do not believe that
there is such a one anywhere on earth?
In heaven, I replied, there is laid up a pattern of it, methinks, which
he who desires may behold, and beholding, may set his own house in order.
But whether such a one exists, or ever will exist in fact, is no matter;
for he will live after the manner of that city, having nothing to do with
I think so, he said.
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