(¶ 3.1.2.9) But nature may also be opposed to artifice, as well as to
what is rare
and unusual; and in this sense it may be disputed,
whether the notions of virtue be natural or not. We readily forget, that
the designs, and projects, and views of men are
principles as necessary in their operation as heat and cold, moist and dry:
But taking them to be free and entirely our own,
it is usual for us to set them in opposition to the other principles of
nature. Should it, therefore, be demanded, whether the
sense of virtue be natural or artificial, I am of opinion, that it is
impossible for me at present to give any precise answer to
this question. Perhaps it will appear afterwards, that our sense of some
virtues is artificial, and that of others natural. The
discussion of this question will be more proper, when we enter upon an
exact detail of each particular vice and virtue.
(¶ 3.1.2.10) Mean while it may not be amiss to observe from these
definitions of
natural and unnatural, that nothing can be more
unphilosophical than those systems, which assert, that virtue is the same
with what is natural, and vice with what is
unnatural. For in the first sense of the word, Nature, as opposed to
miracles, both vice and virtue are equally natural; and in
the second sense, as opposed to what is unusual, perhaps virtue will be
found to be the most unnatural. At least it must be
owned, that heroic virtue, being as unusual, is as little natural as the
most brutal barbarity. As to the third sense of the word,
it is certain, that both vice and virtue are equally artificial, and out of
nature. For however it may be disputed, whether the
notion of a merit or demerit in certain actions be natural or artificial,
it is evident, that the actions themselves are artificial,
and are performed with a certain design and intention; otherwise they could
never be ranked under any of these
denominations. It is impossible, therefore, that the character of natural
and
unnatural can ever, in any sense, mark the
boundaries of vice and virtue.
(¶ 3.1.2.11) Thus we are still brought back to our first position,
that virtue is
distinguished by the pleasure, and vice by the pain, that any
action, sentiment or character gives us by the mere view and contemplation.
This decision is very commodious; because it
reduces us to this simple question, Why any action or sentiment upon the
general view or survey, gives a certain satisfaction
or uneasiness, in order to show the origin of its moral rectitude or
depravity, without looking for any incomprehensible
relations and qualities, which never did exist in nature, nor even in our
imagination, by any clear and distinct conception. I
flatter myself I have executed a great part of my present design by a state
of the question, which appears to me so free from
ambiguity and obscurity.
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