David Hume on
on the Origin of Our Ideas
Book 1 (Of the understanding), Part One, section one from
A Treatise of Human Nature
(1740)
Section One:
(¶ 1.1.1.1)
All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two
distinct kinds, which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS. The difference
betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which
they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or
consciousness. Those perceptions, which enter with most force and
violence, we may name impressions: and under this name I comprehend all
our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first
appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in
thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the perceptions
excited by the present discourse, excepting only those which arise from
the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness
it may occasion. I believe it will not be very necessary to employ many
words in explaining this distinction. Every one of himself will readily
perceive the difference betwixt feeling and thinking. The common degrees
of these are easily distinguished; though it is not impossible but in
particular instances they may very nearly approach to each other. Thus in
sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very violent emotions of soul,
our ideas may approach to our impressions, As on the other hand it
sometimes happens, that our impressions are so faint and low, that we
cannot distinguish them from our ideas. But notwithstanding this near
resemblance in a few instances, they are in general so very different,
that no-one can make a scruple to rank them under distinct heads, and
assign to each a peculiar name to mark the difference [Footnote 1.].
There is another division of our perceptions, which it will be convenient
to observe, and which extends itself both to our impressions and ideas.
This division is into SIMPLE and COMPLEX. Simple perceptions or
impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor separation.
The complex are the contrary to these, and may be distinguished into
parts. Though a particular colour, taste, and smell, are qualities all
united together in this apple, it is easy to perceive they are not the
same, but are at least distinguishable from each other.
Having by these divisions given an order and arrangement to our objects,
we may now apply ourselves to consider with the more accuracy their
qualities and relations. The first circumstance, that strikes my eye, is
the great resemblance betwixt our impressions and ideas in every other
particular, except their degree of force and vivacity. The one seem to be
in a manner the reflexion of the other; so that all the perceptions of
the mind are double, and appear both as impressions and ideas. When I
shut my eyes and think of my chamber, the ideas I form are exact
representations of the impressions I felt; nor is there any circumstance
of the one, which is not to be found in the other. In running over my
other perceptions, I find still the same resemblance and representation.
Ideas and impressions appear always to correspond to each other. This
circumstance seems to me remarkable, and engages my attention for a
moment.
Upon a more accurate survey I find I have been carried away too far by
the first appearance, and that I must make use of the distinction of
perceptions into simple and complex, to limit this general decision, that
all our ideas and impressions are resembling. I observe, that many of our
complex ideas never had impressions, that corresponded to them, and that
many of our complex impressions never are exactly copied in ideas. I can
imagine to myself such a city as the New Jerusalem, whose pavement is
gold and walls are rubies, though I never saw any such. I have seen Paris;
but shall I affirm I can form such an idea of that city, as will
perfectly represent all its streets and houses in their real and just
proportions?
I perceive, therefore, that though there is in general a great,
resemblance betwixt our complex impressions and ideas, yet the rule is not
universally true, that they are exact copies of each other. We may next
consider how the case stands with our simple, perceptions. After the most
accurate examination, of which I am capable, I venture to affirm, that
the rule here holds without any exception, and that every simple idea has
a simple impression, which resembles it, and every simple impression a
correspondent idea. That idea of red, which we form in the dark, and that
impression which strikes our eyes in sun-shine, differ only in degree,
not in nature. That the case is the same with all our simple impressions
and ideas, it is impossible to prove by a particular enumeration of them.
Every one may satisfy himself in this point by running over as many as he
pleases. But if any one should deny this universal resemblance, I know no
way of convincing him, but by desiring him to shew a simple impression,
that has not a correspondent idea, or a simple idea, that has not a
correspondent impression. If he does not answer this challenge, as it is
certain he cannot, we may from his silence and our own observation
establish our conclusion.
Thus we find, that all simple ideas and impressions resemble each other;
and as the complex are formed from them, we may affirm in general, that
these two species of perception are exactly correspondent. Having
discovered this relation, which requires no farther examination, I am
curious to find some other of their qualities. Let us consider how. they
stand with regard to their existence, and which of the impressions and
ideas are causes, and which effects.
The full examination of this question is the subject of the present
treatise; and therefore we shall here content ourselves with establishing
one general proposition, THAT ALL OUR SIMPLE IDEAS IN THEIR FIRST
APPEARANCE ARE DERIVED FROM SIMPLE IMPRESSIONS, WHICH ARE CORRESPONDENT
TO THEM, AND WHICH THEY EXACTLY REPRESENT.
In seeking for phenomena to prove this proposition, I find only those of
two kinds; but in each kind the phenomena are obvious, numerous, and
conclusive. I first make myself certain, by a new, review, of what I have
already asserted, that every simple impression is attended with a
correspondent idea, and every simple idea with a correspondent
impression. From this constant conjunction of resembling perceptions I
immediately conclude, that there is a great connexion betwixt our
correspondent impressions and ideas, and that the existence of the one
has a considerable influence upon that of the other. Such a constant
conjunction, in such an infinite number of instances, can never arise
from chance; but clearly proves a dependence of the impressions on the
ideas, or of the ideas on the impressions. That I may know on which side
this dependence lies, I consider the order of their first appearance; and
find by constant experience, that the simple impressions always take the
precedence of their correspondent ideas, but never appear in the contrary
order. To give a child an idea of scarlet or orange, of sweet or bitter,
I present the objects, or in other words, convey to him these
impressions; but proceed not so absurdly, as to endeavour to produce the
impressions by exciting the ideas. Our ideas upon their appearance
produce not their correspondent impressions, nor do we perceive any
colour, or feel any sensation merely upon thinking of them. On the other
hand we find, that any impression either of the mind or body is
constantly followed by an idea, which resembles it, and is only different
in the degrees of force and liveliness, The constant conjunction of our
resembling perceptions, is a convincing proof, that the one are the
causes of the other; and this priority of the impressions is an equal
proof, that our impressions are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas
of our, impressions.
To confirm this I consider Another plain and convincing phaenomenon;
which is, that, where-ever by any accident the faculties, which give rise
to any impressions, are obstructed in their operations, as when one is
born blind or deaf; not only the impressions are lost, but also their
correspondent ideas; so that there never appear in the mind the least
traces of either of them. Nor is this only true, where the organs of
sensation are entirely destroyed, but likewise where they have never been
put in action to produce a particular impression. We cannot form to
ourselves a just idea of the taste of a pine apple, without having
actually tasted it.
There is however one contradictory phaenomenon, which may prove, that
it is not absolutely impossible for ideas to go before their correspondent
impressions. I believe it will readily be allowed that the several
distinct ideas of colours, which enter by the eyes, or those of sounds,
which are conveyed by the hearing, are really different from each other,
though at the same time resembling. Now if this be true of different
colours, it must be no less so of the different shades of the same
colour, that each of them produces a distinct idea, independent of the
rest. For if this should be denied, it is possible, by the continual
gradation of shades, to run a colour insensibly into what is most remote
from it; and if you will not allow any of the means to be different, you
cannot without absurdity deny the extremes to be the same. Suppose
therefore a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to
have become perfectly well acquainted with colours of all kinds,
excepting one particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never has
been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different shades of that
colour, except that single one, be placed before him, descending
gradually from the deepest to the lightest; it is plain, that he will
perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting, said will be sensible,
that there is a greater distance in that place betwixt the contiguous
colours, than in any other. Now I ask, whether it is possible for him,
from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up to
himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never been
conveyed to him by his senses? I believe i here are few but will be of
opinion that he can; and this may serve as a proof, that the simple ideas
are not always derived from the correspondent impressions; though the
instance is so particular and singular, that it is scarce worth our
observing, and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our
general maxim.
But besides this exception, it may not be amiss to remark on this head,
that the principle of the priority of impressions to ideas must be
understood with another limitation, viz., that as our ideas are images of
our impressions, so we can form secondary ideas, which are images of the
primary; as appears from this very reasoning concerning them. This is
not, properly speaking, an exception to the rule so much as an
explanation of it. Ideas produce the images of them. selves in new ideas;
but as the first ideas are supposed to be derived from impressions, it
still remains true, that all our simple ideas proceed either mediately or
immediately, from their correspondent impressions.
This then is the first principle I establish in the science of human
nature; nor ought we to despise it because of the simplicity of its
appearance. For it is remarkable, that the present question concerning the
precedency of our impressions or ideas, is the same with what has made so
much noise in other terms, when it has been disputed whether there be any
INNATE IDEAS, or whether all ideas be derived from sensation and
reflexion. We may observe, that in order to prove the ideas of extension
and colour not to be innate, philosophers do nothing but shew that they
are conveyed by our senses. To prove the ideas of passion and desire not
to be innate, they observe that we have a preceding experience of these
emotions in ourselves. Now if we carefully examine these arguments, we
shall find that they prove nothing but that ideas are preceded by other
more lively perceptions, from which the are derived, and which they
represent. I hope this clear stating of the question will remove all
disputes concerning it, and win render this principle of more use in our
reasonings, than it seems hitherto to have been.
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