Extracts from Filmer 1652 "Observations Concerning
the Original
of Government upon Mr Hobbes Leviathan"
Extracts from Filmer 1652 "Observations upon Aristotle's
Politiques"
Extracts from Filmer 1680
Patriarcha or the
Natural Power of
Kings
Extracts from Filmer 1652 "Observations Concerning the Original
of Government upon Mr Hobbes Leviathan".
(¶ O.1)
If
God
created only Adam, and of a piece of him made the woman, and if
by generation from them two, as parts of them all mankind be propagated. If
also God gave to Adam not only the dominion over the woman and the
children
that should issue from them, but also over the whole earth to subdue it,
and over all the Creatures on it, so that as long as Adam lived, no man
could claim or enjoy anything but by donation, assignation, or permission
from him, I wonder, how the
right of nature
can be imagined by
Mr Hobbes, which, he
saith, is a liberty for
"each man to use his own power as
he will himself for preservation of his own life";
"a condition of war of
everyone against everyone";
"a right of every man to everything, even to
another's body" [Hobbes 1651 Chapter 14 Margin: Naturally
every man has
Right to everything]
especially since himself affirms
"that originally
the father of every man was also his sovereign lord with power over him of
life and death" [(Hobbes 1651 Chapter 30].
(¶ O.3)
I cannot understand how this
"right of nature"
can be conceived without
imagining a company of men at the very first to have been all created
together without any dependency one of another, or as
"mushrooms
(fungorum more) they all on a sudden were sprung out of the earth
without any obligation one to another",
as
Mr Hobbes'
words are in his book
De Cive, chapter 8, section 1; when the Scripture teaches us otherwise,
that all men came by succession and generation from one man. We must not
deny the truth of the history of the creation.
(¶ O.11)
[Hobbes says that]
"Dominion paternal" [is] not attained "by
generation but by contract", which is "the child's consent, either express
or by other sufficient arguments declared" [(Hobbes 1651 Chapter
20:
Margin: Dominion Paternal how obtained. Not by Generation, but by
Contract].
How
a child can express consent, or by other sufficient
arguments declare it before it comes to the age of discretion I understand
not; yet all men grant it is due before consent can be given, and I take it
Mr Hobbes is of the same mind where he teaches that Abraham's
children were
bound to obey what Abraham should declare to them for God's law - which
could not be but in virtue of the obedience they owed to their parents
[Hobbes 1651 Chapter 26: Margin: Divine Positive Law how made known to
be Law]; they owed, not that they covenantedto give.
Also, where he saith the
"father and the master being before the
institution of commonweals absolute sovereigns in their own
families"
[Hobbes 1651 Chapter 22 Margin: A Regular Private Body, Lawful, as a
Family],
how can it be said that either
children or servants were is a
state of
jus naturae
[the right of nature] till the institution of
commonweals? It is said by Mr Hobbes in his book De Cive chapter 9,
section 7, the
"mother originally hath the government of her children, and
from her the father derives his right, because she brings forth and first
nourisheth them."
But we know that God at the
creation gave the sovereignty
to the man over the woman, as being the nobler and principal agent of
generation. As to the objection that it is not known who is the father to
the son but by the discovery of the mother, and that he is son
to whom the
mother will, and therefore he is the mother's, the answer is that it is not
at the will of the mother to make whom she please the father, for if the
mother be not in possession of a husband,
the child is not reckoned to have
any father at all. But if she be in the possession of a man,
the child
notwithstanding whatsoever the woman discovereth to the contrary is still
reputed to be his in whose possession she is. No child
naturally
and
infallibly knows who are his true parents, yet he must obey those that in
common reputation are so, otherwise
the commandment of honour
thy father and thy mother
were in vain, and no child bound to the obedience of it.
Extracts from Filmer 1652 "Observations upon Aristotle's
Politiques"
... The first government in the world was monarchical, in the father of all
flesh. Adam being commanded to multiply, and people the earth, and to
subdue it, and having dominion given him over all creatures, was thereby
the monarch of the whole world; none of his posterity had any right to
possess anything, but by his grant or permission, or by succession from
him.
...
There never was any such thing as an independent multitude who at first had
a natural right to a community. This is but a fiction or fancy of too many
in these days, who please themselves in running after the opinions of
philosophers and poets, to find out such an original of government as might
promise them some title to liberty... And yet this conceit of original
freedom is the only ground upon which ...
Grotius, Selden, Hobbes, Ascham and others, raise and build their
doctrines of government...
...
Adam was the father, king and lord over his family: a son, a subject, and a
servant or a slave were one and the same thing at first. The father had
power to dispose or sell
his children or servants; whence we find that, at
the first reckoning up of goods in scripture, the manservant and the
maidservant are numbered among the possessions and substance of the owner,
as other goods were...
...
I cannot find anyone place or text in the Bible where any power or
commission is given to a people either to govern themselves, or to choose
themselves governors, or to alter the manner of government at their
pleasure...
[p.2]
... A true representation of the people to be made is as impossible as for
the whole people to govern. The names of an aristocracy, a democracy, a
commonwealth, a state, or any other of like signification are not to be met
either in the law or gospel...
...
That there is a ground in nature for monarchy. Aristotle himself affirms,
saying the first kings were fathers of families. As for any ground of any
other form of government, there has been none yet alleged but a supposed
natural freedom of mankind; the proof whereof I find none do undertake, but
only beg it to be granted...
...
Extracts from Filmer 1680 Patriarcha or the
Natural
Power of
Kings
|
[In the first of his Two Treatises, Locke provides us with a summary of the
account Filmer gives us of this fatherly Authority, as it lies scattered in
the several parts of his writings
(Locke 1689 1.8). I
used this as the basis for my selection of quotes from Patriarcha.
I have put into bold type the passages quoted by Locke]
|
Patriarcha Chapter 1: That the First
Kings
were Fathers of
Families
|
(¶ 1.1)
Since the time that
school divinity
began to flourish there hath been a
common opinion maintained, as well by divines as by divers other learned
men, which affirms: Mankind is
naturally
naturally endowed and born with freedom from
all subjection, and at liberty to choose what form of government it please,
and that the power which any one man hath over others was at first bestowed
according to the discretion of the multitude.
This tenet was first hatched in the
schools, and
hath been fostered by all
succeeding Papists for good divinity. The divines, also, of the
Reformed
Churches
have entertained it, and the common people everywhere tenderly
embrace it as being most plausible to flesh and blood, for that it
prodigally distributes a portion of liberty to the meanest of the
multitude, who magnify liberty as if the height of human felicity were only
to be found in it, never remembering that the desire of liberty was the
first cause of the fall of Adam.
But howsoever this vulgar opinion hath of late obtained a great
reputation, yet it is not to be found in the ancient fathers and doctors of
the primitive Church. It contradicts the doctrine and history of the Holy
Scriptures, the constant practice of all ancient monarchies, and the very
principles of the
law of nature. It is hard to say whether it be more erroneous in
divinity or dangerous in policy.
...
An implicit faith is given to the meanest artificer in his own craft; how
much more is it, then, due to a prince in the profound secrets of
government. The causes and ends of the greatest politic actions and motions
of state dazzle the eyes and exceed the capacities of all men, save only
those that are hourly versed in the managing public affairs...
(¶ 1.2)
To make evident the grounds of this question about the
natural
liberty
of mankind, I will lay down some passages of
Cardinal Bellarmine
that may
best unfold the state of this controversy.
"Secular or civil power is instituted by men; it is in the people, unless
they bestow it on a prince. His power is immediately in the whole
multitude, as in the subject of it; for this power is in the divine law,
but the divine law hath given this power to no particular man. If the
positive law be taken away, there is left no reason why amongst a
multitude - who are equal - one rather than another should bear rule over
the rest. Power is given by the multitude to one man or to more by the same
law of nature; for the commonwealth cannot exercise this power; therefore
it is bound to bestow it upon some one man, or some few. It depends upon
the consent of the multitude to ordain over themselves a king, or consul,
or other magistrates; and if there be lawful cause, the multitude may
change the kingdom into an aristocracy or democracy..."
(¶ 1.3)
I come now to examine the argument which is used by
Cardinal Bellarmine, and
this is the one and only argument I can find produced by my author for the
proof of the
natural
liberty of the people. It is thus framed: That God
hath given or ordained power, is evident by Scripture; but God hath given
it to no particular person, because
by nature
all men are equal, therefore
he hath given power to the people or multitude.
To answer this reason, drawn from the equality of man by nature, I will
first use help of Bellarmine himself, whose very words are these: If many
men had been together created out of the earth, they all ought to have been
princes over their posterity. In these words we have an evident confession
that creation made man prince of his posterity. And indeed not only
Adam, but the succeeding patriarchs had, by right of fatherhood, royal
authority over
their children. Nor dares Bellarmine deny this also.
That the patriarchs, saith he, were endowed with
kingly power, their deeds
do testify; for as Adam was lord of
his children, so his children under him
had a command and power over their own children, but still with
subordination to the first parent, who is lord-paramount over his
children's children to all generations, as being the grandfather of his
people.
(¶ 1.4)
I see not then how
the children of Adam, or of any man else, can be
free from subjection to their parents. And this subjection of children
being the fountain of all regal authority, by the ordination of God
himself; it follows that civil power not only in general is by divine
institution, but even the assignment of it specifically to the eldest
parents, which quite takes away that new and common distinction which
refers only power universal and absolute to God, but power respective in
regard to the special form of government to the choice of the people.
The lordship which Adam by command had over the whole world, and by
right descending from him the patriarchs did enjoy, was as large and ample
as the absolute dominion of any monarch which hath been since creation.
For dominion of life and death we find that Judah, the father,
pronounced
sentence of death against Thamar, his daughter-in-law, for playing the
harlot. Bring her forth, saith he, that she may be burnt. Touching war, we
see that Abraham commanded an army of three hundred and eighteen soldiers
of his own family. And Esau met his brother Jacob with four hundred men at
arms. For matter of peace, Abraham made a league with Abimelech, and
ratified the articles with an oath. These acts of judging in capital
crimes, of making war, and concluding peace, are the chief marks of
"sovereignty that are found in any monarch.......
(¶ 1.8)
It may seem absurd to maintain that
kings now are the fathers of their
people, since experience shows the contrary. It is true, all kings
be not the
natural
parents of their subjects, yet they all either are,
or are to be reputed, the next heirs to those first progenitors, who were
at first the natural parents of the whole people, and in their right
succeed to the exercise of supreme jurisdiction; and such heirs are not
only lords of their
own children, but also of their brethren, and all
others that were subject to their fathers.
And therefore we find that God
told Cain of his brother Abel,
"His desires shall be subject unto thee, and thou shalt rule over
him."
Accordingly, when Jacob bought his brother's birthright, Isaac blessed him
thus:
"Be lord over thy brethren, and let the sons of thy mother bow before
thee."
As long as the first fathers of families lived, the name of patriarchs did
aptly belong unto them; but after a few descents, when the true fatherhood
itself was extinct, and only the right of the father descends to the true
heir, then the title of
prince or king was more significant to express the
power of him who succeeds only to the right of that fatherhood which his
ancestors did
naturally
enjoy. By this means it comes to pass that many
a child, by succeeding a king, hath the right of a father over
many a
greyheaded multitude, and hath the title of Pater Patriae.
[Pater Patriae: Father of the Fatherland. An honour conferred on Cicero
by
the Senate in 63BC, under the
Roman Republic, and subsequently on Julius Ceaser and many
Roman Emperors.
See
Wikipedia
(¶ 1.10)
In all
kingdoms or commonwealths in the world, whether the prince be
the supreme father of the people or but the true heir of such a father, or
whether he come to the crown by usurpation, or by election of the nobles or
of the people, or by any other way whatsoever, or whether some few or a
multitude govern the commonwealth, yet still the authority that is in any
one, or in many, or in all these, is the only right and
natural
authority
of a supreme father. There is and always shall be continued to the end of
the world a natural right of a supreme father over every multitude,
although, by the secret will of God, many at first do most unjustly obtain
the exercise of it.
To confirm this
natural
right of regal power, we find in the
Decalogue that
the law which enjoins obedience to
kings is delivered in the terms of
"Honour thy father," as if all power were originally in the
father. If
obedience to parents be immediately due by a
natural law, and
subjection to
princes but by the mediation of a human ordinance, what reason is there
that the laws of nature should give place to the laws of men, as we see the
power of the father over
his child gives place and is subordinate to the
power of the magistrate?
If we compare the
natural
rights of a father with those of a king, we find
them all one, without any difference at all but only in the latitude or
extent of them: as the father over one family, so the king, as father over
many families, extends his care to preserve, feed, clothe, instruct, and
defend the whole commonwealth. His war, his peace, his courts of justice,
and all his acts of sovereignty, tend only to preserve and distribute to
every subordinate and inferior father, and to
their children, their rights
and privileges, so that all the duties of a king are summed up in an
universal fatherly care of his people.
Patriarcha Chapter 2: It is
Unnatural
for the People to Govern or
Choose Governors
|
(¶ 2.3)
I know the politicians and civil lawyers do not agree well about the
definition of a family, and
Bodin
doth seem in one place to confine it to a
house; yet in his definition he doth enlarge his meaning to all persons
under the obedience of one and the same head of the family, and he approves
better of the propriety of the Hebrew word for a family which is derived
from a word that signifies a head, a prince or lord, than the Greek word
for a family which is derived from
oikoiV, which signifies a house.
Nor doth Aristotle confine a family to one house, but esteems it to be made
of those who daily converse together; whereas, before him, Charondas called
a family homosypio, those that feed together out of one common
pannier. And Epimenides the Cretian terms a family homocapnoi, those
that sit by a common fire or smoke. But let Suarez understand what he
please by Adam's family, if he will but confess, as he needs must, that
Adam and the patriarchs had absolute power of life and death, of
peace and war, and the like, within their houses or families, he must give
us leave, at least, to call them
kings of their houses or families; and if
they be so by the law of
nature, what liberty will be left to
their children to dispose of.
Aristotle
gives the lie to
Plato
and those that say political and
economical societies are all one and do not differ specie, but only
multitudine and paucitate, as if there were no difference
betwixt a great house and a little city. All the argument I find he brings
against them is this:
The community of man and wife differs from the community of master and
servant, because they have several ends. The intention of
nature, by
conjunction of male and female, is generation; but the scope of master and
servant is preservation, so that a wife and a servant are by nature
distinguished, because nature does not work like the
cutlers of
Delphos,
for she makes but one thing for one use. If we allow this argument to be
sound, nothing does follow but only this: that conjugal and despotical
communities do differ. But it is no consequence that therefore economical
and political societies do the like; for though it proves a family to
consist of two distinct communities, yet it follows not that a family and a
commonwealth are distinct, because, as well in the commonweal as in the
families, both these communities are found. {footnote reference to
Aristotle, Politics, Book 1,
chapter 2}
And as this argument comes not home to our point, so it is not able to
prove that title which it shows for; for if it should be granted - which
yet
is false - that generation and preservation differ about the
individuum, yet they agree in the general, and serve both for the
conservation of mankind; even as several servants differ in the particular
ends or offices, as one to brew and another to bake, yet they agree in the
general preservation of the family. Besides, Aristotle confesses that
amongst the barbarians - as he calls all them that are not Grecians - a
wife
and a servant are the same, because by
nature
no barbarian is fit to
govern. It is fit the Grecians should rule over the barbarians; for by
nature a servant and a barbarian is all one. Their family consists only of
an ox for a man-servant and a wife for a maid; so they are fit only to rule
their wives and beasts. Lastly, Aristotle, if it had pleased him, might
have remembered that nature does not always make one thing but for one use.
He knows the tongue serves both to speak and taste.
(¶ 2.15)
It is truly said by
his late Majesty King James: A
king
can never be
so notoriously vicious but he will generally favour justice, and maintain
some order, except in the particulars wherein his inordinate lust carries
him away. Even cruel Domitian, Dionysius, the tyrant, and many others are
commended by historians for great observers of justice. A
natural
reason is
to be rendered for it. It is the multitude of people and the abundance of
their riches which are the only strength and glory of every prince. The
bodies of his subjects do him service in war, and their goods supply his
present wants: therefore, if not out of affection to his people, yet out of
natural love to himself, every tyrant desires to preserve the lives and
protect the goods of his subjects, which cannot be done but by justice, and
if it be not done, the prince's loss is the greatest. [By contrast:] in a
popular state every man knows the public good doth not depend wholly on his
care, but the commonwealth may well enough be governed by others though he
tend only his private benefit, he never takes the public to be his own
business.
(¶ 2.17)
If it be
unnatural
for the multitude to chose their governors, or to
govern or to partake in the government, what can be thought of that
damnable conclusion which is made by too many that the multitude may
correct or depose their prince if need be? Surely the unnaturalness and
injustice of this position cannot sufficiently be expressed; for admit that
a
king made a contract or paction with his people, either
originally in his
ancestors or personally at his coronation - for both these pactions some
dream of but cannot offer any proof for either - yet by no law of any
nation
can a contract be thought broken, except that first a lawful trial be by
the ordinary judge of the breakers thereof, or else every man may be both
party and judge in his own case, which is absurd once to be thought, for
then it will lie in the hands of the headless multitude when they please to
cast off the yoke of government - that God hath laid upon them - to judge
and
punish him, by whom they should be judged and punished themselves,
Aristotle can tell us what judges the multitude are in their own case
pleistoi fauloi kritai peri twn oikeiwu. The judgement of the
multitude in disposing of the
sovereignty may
be seen in the Roman history, where we may find many good emperors murdered
by the people, and many bad elected by them. [Filmer gives examples]
Patriarcha Chapter 3: Positive Laws do not Infringe the
Natural
and Fatherly Power of
Kings
|
(¶ 3.1)
Hitherto I have endeavoured to show the
natural institution of regal
authority, and to free it from subjection to an arbitrary election of the
people. It is necessary also to inquire whether human laws have a
superiority over princes, because those that maintain the acquisition of
royal jurisdiction from the people do subject the exercise of it to
positive laws. But in this also they err; for as
kingly power is by the
law
of God, so it hath no inferior
law to limit it.
The father of a family governs by no other law than by his own will,
not by the wills of his sons or servants. There is no nation that allows
children any action or remedy for being unjustly governed; and
yet, for all
this, every father is bound by the law of
nature
to do his best for the
preservation of his family. But much more is a
king always tied by the same
law of nature to keep this general ground, that the safety of the kingdom
be his chief law; he must remember that the profit of every man in
particular, and of all together in general, is not always one and the same;
and that the public is to be preferred before the private; and that the
force of laws must not be so great as natural equity itself, which cannot
fully be comprised in any laws whatsoever, but is to be left to the
religious achievement of those who know how to manage the affairs of the
state, and wisely to balance the particular profit with the counterpoise of
the public, according to the infinite variety of times, places, persons. A
proof unanswerable for the superiority of princes above laws is
this, that there were kings long before there were any laws. For a long
time the word of a king was the only law; and if practice, as saith Sir
Walter Raleigh, declare the greatness of authority, even the best kings of
Judah and Israel were not tied to any law; but they did whatsoever they
pleased in the greatest matters.
[The following passage from Filmer comments on the account of how the Jews
first acquired a king. This is the passage from 1 Samuel chapter 11 in the
King James version of the Jewish Bible that Filmer refers to. Samuel was a
prophet of God and a judge in Israel:
And it came to pass, when Samuel was old, that he made his sons judges
over Israel.... And his sons walked not in his ways, but turned aside after
lucre, and took bribes, and perverted judgment. Then all the elders of
Israel gathered themselves together, and came to Samuel unto Ramah, And
said unto him, Behold, thou art old, and thy sons walk not in thy ways: now
make us a king to judge us like all the nations. But the thing displeased
Samuel, when they said, Give us a king to judge us. And Samuel prayed unto
the Lord. And the Lord said unto Samuel, Hearken unto the voice of the
people in all that they say unto thee: for they have not rejected thee, but
they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them.... Now therefore
hearken unto their voice: howbeit yet protest solemnly unto them, and shew
them the manner of the king that shall reign over them. And Samuel told all
the words of the Lord unto the people that asked of him a king. And he
said, This will be the manner of the king that shall reign over you: He
will take your sons, and appoint them for himself, for his chariots, and to
be his horsemen; and some shall run before his chariots. And he will
appoint him captains over thousands, and captains over fifties; and will
set them to ear his ground, and to reap his harvest, and to make his
instruments of war, and instruments of his chariots. And he will take your
daughters to be confectionaries, and to be cooks, and to be bakers. And he
will take your fields, and your vineyards, and your oliveyards, even the
best of them, and give them to his servants. And he will take the tenth of
your seed, and of your vineyards, and give to his officers, and to his
servants. And he will take your menservants, and your maidservants, and
your goodliest young men, and your asses, and put them to his work. He will
take the tenth of your sheep: and ye shall be his servants. And ye shall
cry out in that day because of your king which ye shall have chosen you;
and the Lord will not hear you in that day. Nevertheless the people refused
to obey the voice of Samuel; and they said, Nay; but we will have a king
over us; That we also may be like all the nations; and that our king may
judge us, and go out before us, and fight our battles. And Samuel heard all
the words of the people, and he rehearsed them in the ears of the Lord. And
the Lord said to Samuel, Hearken unto their voice, and make them a
king.]
(¶ 3.2)
The unlimited jurisdiction of
kings is so amply described by Samuel
that it hath given occasion to some to imagine that it was but either a
plot or trick of Samuel to keep the government himself and family by
frightening the Israelites with the mischiefs in monarchy, or else a
prophetical description only of the future ill-government of Saul. But the
vanity of these conjectures are judiciously discovered in that majestical
discourse of the true law of free monarchy, wherein it is evidently shown
that the scope of Samuel was to teach the people a dutiful obedience to
their king, even in those things which themselves did esteem mischievous
and inconvenient; for by telling them what a king would do he, indeed,
instructs them what a subject must suffer, yet not so that it is right for
kings to do injury, but it is right for them to go unpunished by the people
if they do it....
(¶ 3.5)
The reason why laws have been also made by
kings was this: When kings
were
either busied with wars, or distracted with public cares, so that every
private man could not have access to their persons, to learn their will and
pleasure, then were laws of necessity invented, that so every particular
subject might find his prince's pleasure deciphered unto him in the table
of his laws....
(¶ 3.6)
Now albeit kings who make the laws be, as King James teaches us,
above the laws, yet will they rule their subjects by the law; and a
king, governing in a settled kingdom, leaves to be a king, and degenerates
into a tyrant, so soon as he seems to rule according to his laws; yet where
he sees the laws rigorous or doubtful he may mitigate and interpret.
General laws made in Parliament may, upon known respects to the king, by
his authority be mitigated or suspended upon causes only known to him.
Citation suggestion
Referencing
My referencing suggestions for
bibliography
entries and intext
references are:
Filmer, R. 1652/Hobbes, "Observations Concerning the Original
of Government upon Mr Hobbes Leviathan" Paragraph
numbers from the web extracts at
<http://studymore.org.uk/xFil.htm>
|
With references in the
text to
(Filmer 1652/Hobbes par -)
|
Filmer, R. 1652/Aristotle, "Observations on Aristotles Politiques
Touching Forms of Government" Paragraph
numbers from the web extracts at
<http://studymore.org.uk/xFil.htm>
|
With references in the
text to
(Filmer 1652/Aristotle par -)
|
Filmer, R. 1680, Patriarcha or the Natural Power of
Kings Paragraph
numbers from the web extracts at
<http://studymore.org.uk/xFil.htm>
|
With references in the
text to
Study
Link
Andrew Roberts' web Study Guide
Top of
Page
Take a Break - Read a Poem
Click coloured words to go where you want
Andrew Roberts likes to hear from users: To contact him, please
use the Communication
Form
|
Index
Bellarmine, Robert (1542-1641) Italian theological theorist:
Patriarcha 1.2 and 1.3
childhood: nature of
O.1 - Filmer contrasts his idea with Hobbes
O.11
- Child owned by man who owns his mother
O.11
- Son, subject, and slave the same thing at first.
Aristotle1
- Parents have royal authority over children
1.3
- No child free
1.4
- People are like children to kings
1.8
- Natural rights of father and king:
1.10
- Father has absolute power of life and death 2.3
- No remedy for injustice 3.1
contract not the basis of society: See Observations on Hobbes
O.11 and
Patriarcha 2.17.
God: When Filmer refers to God, I infer he is making a
theological
rather than a
natural argument. See
O.1 -
O.11 -
Patriarcha 1.3 -
1.4 -
1.8 -
1.10 -
2.17 -
3.1 -
kings fathers of people and next heirs to Adam:
Patriarcha 1.8. (Also pars 1.3 and
1.4
law:
human (positive) laws do not infringe the power of kings
Patriarcha
chapter 3.
nature - natural Where Filmer refers
to
natural rights, or by the power of nature, my inference would that the
argument is from nature not
theology. See title -
unreasonableness of Hobbes' right of
nature - and:
natural liberty false:
Patriarcha
chapter 1.
natural power of kings true
Patriarcha
chapter 3.
right of nature a puzzle: See Observations on Hobbes O.1, O.3, O.11.
unnatural things: See Patriarcha
2.3 and
2.17
|