[Margin: Inconstant names]
(¶ 4.24) The names of such things as affect us, that is, which
please and displease
us, because all men be not alike affected with the same thing, nor the same
man at all times, are in the common discourses of men of inconstant
signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signify our conceptions,
and all our affections are but conceptions; when we conceive the same
things differently, we can hardly avoid different naming of them. For
though the nature of that we conceive be the same; yet the diversity of our
reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body and
prejudices of opinion, gives everything a tincture of our different
passions. And therefore in reasoning, a man must take heed of words; which,
besides the signification of what we imagine of their nature, have a
signification also of the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker;
such as are the names of virtues and vices: for one man calleth wisdom what
another calleth fear; and one cruelty what another justice; one prodigality
what another magnanimity; and one gravity what another stupidity, etc. And
therefore such names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination. No
more can metaphors and tropes of speech: but these are less dangerous
because they profess their inconstancy, which the other do not.